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1. INTRODUCTION: STATE POLICE POWERS AND POLLUTION CONTROL
IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD
International vessels emit greenhouse gases. Invasive species are
released in ship ballast water. Oil pollution and related dangers from the
tanker trade threaten state coastlines. Recent years have seen an explo-
sion in international shipping trade and international commerce, along
with a simultaneous rise in global awareness of the problem of pollution
and a series of international conventions and agreements intended to
address the transboundary pollution problem on a global scale.' Coastal
* University of Miami, Juris Doctor, May 2011. The author would like to thank Professor
Bernard H. Oxman for his insight into this issue and his patience with the article's development.
Research on this article is for the time period ending April 7, 2011, and may not reflect the most
recent information and changes. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are the author's
alone, and are not reflective of the views of any agency or institution with which the author may
be affiliated.
1. Nicholas A. Robinson, International Environmental Law, SC56 ALI-ABA Course of
Study Materials 185 (Feb. 11, 1998) sets forth some of the global framework of treaties designed
to approximate a legal regime of international environmental law, including the UN Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Part XII; the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change;
the Kyoto Protocol; the Basel Convention on Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste;
and the Vienna Convention on Protection of the Stratospheric Ozone Layer (including the
Montreal Protocol), among others. Within the field of international shipping, the most prominent
international environmental protection agreement is the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships of 1973 as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto
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states of the United States have long sought to regulate ships in interna-
tional commerce as a major source of pollution of both water and air,
with varying degrees of success.2
The Ninth Circuit, in its decision in Pacific Merchant Shipping
Ass'n v. Goldstene (PMSA III),3 has fired a new salvo in the longstand-
ing debate about the limits of state powers and the ability of states to
regulate ships in international trade. The Court upheld California's Ves-
sel Fuel Rules,' which require ships calling at a California port to dis-
continue the use of low grade fuel, and instead use either marine gas oil
or marine diesel oil that meets certain percentage requirements for the
quantity of sulfur in the fuels.' The regulations apply to the use of
bunker fuel by ships calling at California ports in a geographical area
identified by California law as "Regulated California Waters," which are
defined as the waters within twenty-four nautical miles of the California
shoreline.' The regulations subject ship owners and operators of vessels
entering California ports to a wide range of sanctions, including fines,
injunctive relief, and criminal prosecution.' The regulations also attempt
to narrowly avoid various preemption and supremacy issues; they con-
tain an exemption from the regulatory regime for ships in "innocent pas-
sage" and an express sunset clause that provides for termination when
the regulatory board "makes a finding that the federal government has
adopted and is enforcing requirements that will achieve equivalent emis-
sion reductions."' However, with these regulations, California "pushes
[the] state's legal authority to its very limits,"9 and breathes new life into
(MARPOL 73/78), which regulates pollution from oil, harmful substances, sewage, garbage, and,
as of May 19, 2005, airborne emissions. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships (MARPOL), International Maritime Organization, May 19, 2005, available at http://
www.imo.org/about/conventions/listofconventions/pages/intemational-convention-for-the-
prevention-of-pollution-from-ships-%28marpol%29.aspx.
2. See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000)(overruling certain Washington State
regulations related to "general navigation watch procedures, English language skills, training and
casualty reporting."); Ray v. Atl. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978) (overruling certain
Washington State regulations that related to the design and equipment of oil tankers in Puget
Sound); Askew v. Am. Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973) (upholding the State of
Florida's strict liability regime for oil spills); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362
U.S. 440 (1960) (upholding the application of the City of Detroit's local air pollution laws to
ships); Lake Carriers Ass'n v. Kelley, 527 F. Supp. 1114 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (upholding the State
of Michigan's water pollution standards when applied to discharges of sewage from ships).
3. 639 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2011).
4. CAL. CODE REGs. tit. 13, § 2299.2 (2009); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 93118.2 (2009).
5. Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass'n, 639 F.3d at 1158.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1159.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1162.
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an old question of how far states can reach in regulating pollution from
ocean-going vessels in international trade.
The problem of state environmental regulation in a globalized
world is recurrent and vexing. Some court-watchers thought that the
question of the ability of the states to regulate pollution from ships in
international trade would be definitively decided by the Supreme Court
in the 2000 case United States v. Locke.'o This was a case in which an
international shipping industry plaintiff (Intertanko) challenged a Wash-
ington State regulatory regime that addressed tanker equipment, staffing,
personnel qualifications, reporting, and operating standards for oil tank-
ers in Puget Sound." However, the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Locke, although discussing the concerns of the international
community with Washington's regulatory scheme, was ultimately
decided on the relatively narrow grounds that the state regulations relat-
ing to tanker design, operation, personnel qualifications, and manning of
vessels were preempted by Title I of the Ports and Waterways Safety
Act of 1972 (PWSA).12 Thus, Locke was not the dispositive opinion
regarding the limits of state environmental regulation that some had
hoped it would be, and, while some specific provisions of the Washing-
ton laws were overturned, the opinion acknowledges that others were
potentially permissible exercises of the state's police power." Instead,
the question of how far a state may reach in setting and enforcing envi-
ronmental standards on ships in international trade remains a matter for
debate and speculation at the Supreme Court level.
The debate over the limits of state power is freshly relevant today,
as concern with global warming and global greenhouse gas regulation
has led states and localities to pass stringent standards for automobile
fuels and emissions, again with varying degrees of success.' 4 While the
10. 529 U.S. 89 (2000).
11. Locke, 529 U.S. at 97. See also Barry Hart Dubner, On the Interplay of International Law
of the Sea and the Prevention of Maritime Pollution-How Far Can a State Proceed in Protecting
Itself from Conflicting Norms in International Law, 11 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 137 (1998)
(analyzing both the Intertanko case and the situation in the Bosporus Straits as case studies in state
power to regulate in an international regime); Michael P. Mullahy, Note, States' Rights and the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A Sea of Confusion?, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 607 (1996) (arguing that the
Supreme Court should find in favor of Washington State in Locke).
12. Locke, 529 U.S. at 110-12.
13. Patrick 0. Gudridge, International Decisions: United States v. Locke, 94 AM. J. INT'L L.
745, 748-49 (2000) (analyzing the gap left by the Court in relying only on PWSA preemption). It
is unknown which state regulations might have met the Court's test, as the State of Washington
repealed the regulations at issue before the case was heard on remand. Int'l Ass'n of Independent
Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Locke, 216 F.3d 880 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Intertanko II').
14. See, e.g., Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d
295, 399 (D. Vt. 2007) (upholding Vermont's adoption of California's greenhouse gas emissions
standard against an industry challenge); Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F.
Supp. 2d 1151, 1189 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (upholding the same California greenhouse gas emissions
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Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA' 5 opened the door
for the federal regulation of greenhouse gases, there is as of yet no
strong rule, and recent debate in Congress included a budget provision,
passed by the House of Representatives, that would forbid the EPA from
regulating greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act.16 Furthermore, the
United States government has been slow to participate in international
agreements that would address global climate change by treaty." Thus,
there are strong indications that states, frustrated with the federal process
and desirous of swift change, will become the primary movers of climate
change and greenhouse gas regulation. It is within this framework that
the decision in Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass'n stands poised to act as a
major precedent to allow coastal states to take the lead in regulating
greenhouse gas emissions from inbound ships.
This Note will look at the background of Supreme Court jurispru-
dence in the field of state regulation of pollution from ships, with a par-
ticular focus on the line of cases regarding state oil tanker and oil spill
prevention regulation that culminated in United States v. Locke. The
tanker regulation cases provide the backdrop for the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass'n by providing the analytical
framework for the determination of when a state has overstepped its
boundaries in regulation of ships. However, as this Note argues, the oil
tanker cases left the question of pollution regulation undecided and
incomplete, with competing case lines applying different presumptions
depending upon whether a regulation is characterized as dealing with the
traditional state realm of pollution or as an interference with the neces-
sary uniformity of international standards.
The Note will then closely examine the Pacific Merchants Shipping
Ass'n decision, including an evaluation of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning
regarding the potential jurisdictional reach of state pollution regulation
standards from a challenge in California). But see Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New
York, No. 08 Civ. 7837(PAC), 2008 WL 4866021, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2008) (enjoining
enforcement of New York City's fuel efficiency standards for taxicabs as likely preempted by
federal law).
15. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
16. House Vote 96 - Bars New Regulation of Certain Greenhouse Gases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
18, 2011, http://politics.nytimes.com/congress/votes/112/house/1/96. This amendment was passed
by a margin of 35 votes in the House of Representatives on February 18, 2011. Id.
17. See S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (A unanimously approved resolution "[e]xpressing the
sense of the Senate regarding the conditions for the United States becoming a signatory to any
international agreement on greenhouse gas emissions under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change" that such an agreement would cause serious harm to the
economy of the United States.); John M. Broder, A Novel Tactic in Climate Fight Gains Some
Traction, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/science/earth/09
montreal.html (evaluating the likelihood of the United States participating in an agreement to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the already-ratified Montreal Protocol).
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and the potential conflict of the California statutes with national and
international uniformity in maritime regulation. This Note will then ask
whether the Ninth Circuit's decision presents a tenable position regard-
ing state regulation of greenhouse gases or a legislative overreach by
California into areas of federal and international domain. This Note will
argue that the intrinsically global problems of air and water pollution
can no longer be regarded as primarily within the domain of the states,
and that more aggressive federal intervention into international environ-
mental issues will soon be necessary in order to prevent a patchwork of
regulation by state and local governments such as California.
II. NAVIGATING THE SHOALS OF HISTORY AND PRECEDENT:
RAY, HAMMOND, AND LOCKE
Regulation and control over air and water pollution were tradition-
ally matters of state concern in American jurisprudence, as part of the
larger "traditional state police powers" over health and safety." How-
ever, regulation of ships, shipping, and the maritime environment are
traditionally matters for federal regulation and involvement, as the need
for uniformity in regulation is greatest for fields such as shipping that
are particularly intended to cross state, national, and international bor-
ders.11 Indeed, "[t]he authority of Congress to regulate interstate naviga-
tion, without embarrassment from intervention of the separate States and
resulting difficulties with foreign nations, was cited in the Federalist
Papers as one of the reasons for adopting the Constitution."20 Thus,
there is a historical tension that must be resolved whenever a state
attempts to control pollution by regulating ships or shipping practices.
The first battleground in the series of challenges to state pollution
control regimes with potential international effects was in a series of
cases regarding oil tanker regulation and prevention of oil spills. Over
the course of almost thirty years, the Supreme Court and the Ninth Cir-
cuit struggled to determine when state law oil spill and oil pollution
prevention regimes that regulate ships interfere with federal and interna-
tional prerogatives. The main Supreme Court cases from this era, Ray v.
18. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960)
("Legislation designed to free from pollution the very air that people breathe clearly falls within
the exercise of even the most traditional concept of what is compendiously known as the police
power."). See also Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986) (holding that states "retain[] broad
regulatory authority to protect the health and safety of its citizens and the integrity of its natural
resources [in the face of a Commerce Clause challenge].").
19. See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 315 (1851).
20. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 99 (2000) ("Intertanko II") (citing THE FEDERALIST
Nos. 44 (James Madison), 12 (Alexander Hamilton), 64 (John Jay)). See also Gudridge, supra
note 13, at 748.
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Atlantic Richfield Co.2 1 and United States v. Locke (Intertanko 11)22 both
invalidated at least some Washington State regulations that governed
ships in Puget Sound-regulations that were intended to minimize the
effects of oil pollution and oil spills. Yet in the intervening time period,
in Chevron U.S.A. v. Hammond, the Ninth Circuit upheld Alaska state
regulations governing the deballasting of oil tankers to prevent pollution
from residual oil in ballast water.2 3 Over a vigorous dissent by Justice
Byron White,24 the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Hammond.2 5 The
denial of certiorari in Hammond left some question as to the extent of
federal supremacy over offshore pollution from ships that affected
coastal states. The failure to directly address the limits of state power in
this area left a loophole in the doctrine of federal supremacy that was not
fully closed by the relatively narrow preemption holding in Locke, and
that the Ninth Circuit revived to uphold state regulation in Pacific
Merchant Shipping Ass'n.26
In order to elucidate the line of cases relating to oil pollution from
ships, it is helpful to set out the analytic framework of challenges to state
regulatory regimes. State pollution control laws that regulate ships or
shipping practices tend to be challenged on a variety of federal preemp-
tion and federal supremacy grounds, including 1) express federal statu-
tory preemption; 2) implied field preemption by federal regulation; and
3) preemption due to conflict with federal statutes or treaties, executive
authority over foreign affairs, or the Domestic and Foreign Commerce
Clause.27
For example, in Intertanko v. Locke (Intertanko I), the industry
trade group plaintiffs alleged that the state regulatory requirements at
issue were preempted by federal statutes and regulations, preempted by
international treaties, invalid under the Supremacy Clause, in violation
21. 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
22. 529 U.S. 89 (2000).
23. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1140 (1985) (White, J. dissenting).
24. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Sheffield, 471 U.S. 1140, 1140-41 (1985) (White, J. dissenting).
25. Id. at 1140.
26. See Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass'n v. Goldstene, 639 F.3d 1154, 1180 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing
Hammond for the proposition that states were permitted to regulate ships as a matter of coastal
environmental regulation).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (the "Commerce Clause") grants to Congress the power "[tlo
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes." Commerce Clause challenges to state regulatory regimes are often brought in conjunction
with preemption challenges under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
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of the Commerce Clause, and infringed upon the exclusive foreign
affairs power of the federal government.28 Similarly, in Ray v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., the Supreme Court analyzed the industry plaintiffs' chal-
lenge to a set of Washington State pollution control laws under different
potential preemption and conflict rubrics, such as express or implied
federal preemption by statute, preemption due to a dominant interest in
the field of regulation, actual conflict with a federal statute, and frustra-
tion of federal goals. 29
The various categories of preemption are not "rigidly distinct." 30
However, the analysis for each demands evaluation of the state, federal,
and international interests at stake in the legislation in order to determine
if the balance between federal interests and state interests is properly
maintained. The tension between federal and state interests is heightened
when the state regulation in a traditional state sphere touches upon inter-
national policy interests. The Supreme Court has long asserted an exclu-
sive foreign relations power that lies with the federal government to the
exclusion of state interference." In the 1968 case Zchernig v. Miller,3 2
the Supreme Court struck down an Oregon inheritance law that discrimi-
nated against citizens of certain Communist countries on the grounds
that the law interfered with the foreign affairs prerogative of the federal
government, even in the absence of an explicit federal policy.33
Although probate law and distribution of estates are areas that were tra-
ditionally relegated to states, "those regulations must give way if they
impair the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign policy."34 This pre-
cedent set the stage for "dormant foreign affairs" preemption (also
referred to as "Zschernig preemption"") of state laws that unreasonably
interfere with the conduct of federal foreign policy."
Yet Zschernig remains the only case where the Supreme Court has
explicitly applied the dormant foreign affairs power in a preemption
28. Int'l Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Locke (Intertanko 1), 148 F.3d 1053,
1058 (9th Cir. 1998).
29. Ray v. Atl. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 160-78 (1978).
30. Intertanko 1, 148 F.3d at 1060 n.8.
31. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, 2008 Supplement 27 (Kenneth R. Thomas ed. 2008) [hereinafter
CONSTTUTIONAL SUPPLEMENT]. See also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) ("Our
system of government ... requires that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be left
entirely free from local interference."); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) ("No state
can rewrite our foreign policy to conform to its own domestic policies. Power over external affairs
is not shared by the states; it is vested in the national government exclusively.").
32. 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968).
33. Id.; CONSTITUTIONAL SUPPLEMENT, supra note 31, at 28.
34. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 440.
35. CONSTITUTIONAL SUPPLEMENT, supra note 31, at 29 n.43.
36. Id. at 27.
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analysis to invalidate a state statute. 7 In Crosby v. National Foreign
Trade Council," a case that came out during the same term as United
States v. Locke, the Court declined to use the robust Zschernig preemp-
tion analysis used by the First Circuit in the case below,39 instead decid-
ing to invalidate Massachusetts's Anti-Burma statute on the relatively
narrow grounds that the statute was preempted by federal legislation that
had been enacted shortly after the state statute.40 Similarly, in the 2003
case American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi,4 1 the Court discussed the
scope of the broad "dormant foreign affairs" preemption doctrine of
Zchernig, but decided the case based on a direct conflict between a Cali-
fornia insurance law and an executive order, in a traditional conflict pre-
emption analysis.4 2
Nevertheless, an aura of "foreign affairs preemption" emanates
from the Supreme Court's analysis in United States v. Locke
("Intertanko II") and informs the Court's discussion of the preemption
issue. In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., the Court began the preemption
analysis by granting the Washington State environmental law a pre-
sumption of validity:
The Court's prior cases indicate that a when a State's exercise of its
police power is challenged under the Supremacy Clause, "we start
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the states were
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress."4 3
For decades this quote and similar language served as the analytical
starting point for the resolution of whether a state environmental regula-
tion was preempted under the Supremacy Clause." But the Supreme
37. Id. at 28.
38. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
39. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 50 (1st Cir. 1999), rev'd sub nom.
Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
40. Bernard H. Oxman, Brannon P. Denning & Jack H. McCall, International Decision:
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 750, 753 (2000).
41. 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
42. Id. at 439; CONSTITUTIONAL SUPPLEMENT, supra note 31, at 29.
43. Ray v. Atl. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978)(citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
44. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442-43 (applying
a presumption against preemption when the state legislates in the area of pollution control, an area
that "clearly falls within the exercise of even the most traditional concept [of the state's police
power.]"); Askew v. Am. Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 341 (1973) (upholding a
Florida oil spill liability statute and noting that "[e]ven though Congress has acted in the admiralty
area, state regulation is permissible, absent a clear conflict with federal law."); Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 488 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 471 U.S. 1140 (1985) (citing
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947), for the presumption of validity of state
environmental laws, and upholding Alaska's regulation of ballast water released from ships).
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Court in United States v. Locke explicitly rejected a presumption of
validity for state environmental regulations:
As Rice indicates, an "assumption" of nonpreemption is not triggered
when the State regulates in an area where there has been a history of
significant federal presence. . . . In Ray, and in the case before us,
Congress has legislated in the field from the earliest days of the
Republic, creating an extensive federal statutory and regulatory
scheme. The state laws now in question bear upon national and inter-
national maritime commerce, and in this area there is no beginning
assumption that concurrent regulation by the State is a valid exercise
of its police powers.45
This rejection of a presumption in favor of state environmental regula-
tion appears to be an effect of the international dimensions of the case,
which, while present in Ray, were actively argued in the brief for the
United States in Locke.4 6
The United States, in its brief, detailed the historic role of the fed-
eral government in the regulation of interstate and international com-
merce, and argued that insofar as the federal regulations passed under
the authority of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act were embodiments
of international standards, the international standards preempted state
regulation."7 The United States contended that an international treaty
could have as much preemptive force as a federal statute, and that inter-
national agreements restrict any concurrent power held by states to "the
narrowest of limits."4 8 Although the Supreme Court, in the end, held that
the regulations were directly preempted by a federal statute and not by
the broad foreign affairs power, the tone and tenor of the opinion,
including the discussion of international standards and the concerns of
the United States with international reciprocity, hints at the federal for-
eign affairs powers arguments of Zschernig, and the presence of interna-
tional considerations strengthens the federal interest in uniformity of
45. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000) (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)) (emphasis added).
46. Sean D. Murphy, Treaty Obligations as Evidence of Federal Preemption, 95 Am. J. INT'L
L. 132, 132 (2001) (discussing the international concerns voiced by the United States in the
principal brief in Locke).
47. Id. at 132. Illustrative treaties to which the United States is a party include the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974; the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973 as amended by the 1978 Protocol (MARPOL 73/78); and
the International Convention of Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for
Seafarers, With Annex 1978 (STCW). Locke, 529 U.S. at 102-03. See also United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 21(2), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 405 (stating that
the laws and regulations of a coastal state, including laws relating to pollution control, shall not
apply to the "design, construction, manning, or equipment of foreign ships unless they are giving
effect to generally accepted international rules or standards.").
48. Murphy, supra note 46, at 133.
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regulation.49
In the end, Locke answered the specific question presented
(whether Washington State's regulation of international ships in the
areas of event reporting, watch procedures, operating procedures, and
vessel manning was preempted by the PWSA) without giving a sweep-
ing doctrinal basis for the analysis of conflicts between state environ-
mental regulation and federal policy over international trade and
international affairs. Therefore, in many ways Locke left a vitally impor-
tant question unanswered and relatively unaddressed: what is the proper
balance between state and federal interests when the state law purports
to regulate pollution of its own air or waters from international ships-
an area where states have held historic police powers-as opposed to the
regulation of design, manning, reporting, or operation of ships at sea?
The Locke Court did not address, nor even cite, such historical ship
pollution cases such as Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit"o
and Chevron U.S.A. v. Hammond." Indeed, the Court's fleeting mention
of Askew v. American Waterways Operators indicates that there may
still be a relevant difference between regulation of pollution and other
forms of standards-setting as applied to international ships, at least
where the statute, by a savings clause or some other mechanism, leaves
some room for state regulation.52 The failure of the Court to resolve (or
really even address) the question of when and how state regulation of
ships would be permissible to prevent in-state pollution is particularly
troublesome when applicable federal statutes, such as the Clean Air Act
and the Clean Water Act, leave explicit allowance for more stringent
state regulation than the federal minimum, thus opening the door to
greater potential conflicts with federal and international standards-set-
ting regimes." It would be only a matter of time before a state regula-
tory body, such as the California Air Resources Board, would be more
than willing to walk through that open door.
49. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. at 102-03. See also Gudridge, supra note 13, at 747-48
(concluding that the justices "readily appreciated the conjoined national and international
dimensions of the case [when finding the state regulations preempted].").
50. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
51. 726 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1984).
52. Locke, 529 U.S. at 106 ("We have upheld state laws imposing liability for pollution
caused by oil spills.") (citing Askew v. Am. Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973)).
53. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2006) (Retention of State Authority); Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2006) (State Authority). Both provisions explicitly retain the
authority of states to regulate more stringently than the federal minimums set by the EPA.
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II. PACIFIC MERCHANT SHIPPING Ass'N v. GOLDSTENE. THE NINTH
CIRCUIT ONCE AGAIN ADDRESSES THE LIMITS OF STATE
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL SHIPS
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass'n v.
Goldstene (PMSA III),5 is the most recent in a series of cases involving
the California Air Resources Board (CARB) and its attempts to regulate
emissions from ocean-going ships and decrease the exposure of Califor-
nians to sulfur oxides and other pollutants from the use of low-grade
fuels. The Ninth Circuit upheld CARB's Vessel Fuel Rules, which regu-
lated the type of fuel that ships could burn within "California Regulated
Waters," defined as waters within twenty-four miles of the California
coastline.55
In order to uphold the California regulations, the Ninth Circuit had
to analyze two different but interrelated issues: whether California had
jurisdiction to regulate beyond the three-mile boundary of its territorial
sea, as defined by the Submerged Lands Act, and whether the regula-
tions-even though applicable only to vessels entering California ports
(presumably internal waters of California)-impermissibly interfered
with navigation and foreign and domestic commerce in violation of the
Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.56
This meant that the Ninth Circuit again had to face the confluence of
international interests and traditional state police powers that were pre-
sent in the oil tanker regulation cases of Ray, Hammond, and especially
Locke. The fact that the Ninth Circuit was able to uphold the California
regulations starkly demonstrates the distinction between historical state
regulation of pollution and federal supremacy over maritime and inter-
national trade that was left over by the Supreme Court's narrow holding
in Locke. This distinction could provide a potential precedent for further
fragmentation of state environmental regulations with effects on interna-
tional ships and United States foreign policy in international trade.
A. The Procedural Posture of the Case and the Decisions Below
The factual circumstances that led to the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass'n were undisputed. "[O]cean-going ves-
sels, which typically utilize large diesel engines, are a significant source
of air pollution in California, due in part to their widespread use of low-
grade bunker fuel."" This bunker fuel consists of residual fuel remain-
ing after primary fuel distillation, and "contains an average of about
54. 639 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2011).
55. Id. at 1158.
56. Id. at 1162-63.
57. Relevant facts are cited from the district court's opinion below. Pac. Merch. Shipping
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25,000 parts per million (ppm) of sulfur, as opposed to diesel fuel for
trucks and other motor vehicles, which is limited to 15 ppm sulfur."58
The aggregate tonnage of sulfur emitted by ocean-going vessels made
vessel emissions the largest source of sulfur oxides pollution in the
state.59 It was also undisputed that "twenty-seven million Californians,
or eighty percent of California's population, are exposed to" these emis-
sions from ocean-going ships, increasing the risks of premature death,
cancer, aggravated asthma and other respiratory illnesses, and heart
disease.60
CARB's first attempt at regulation, the "Marine Vessel Rules,"
applied emissions standards within twenty-four nautical miles of the
California coast to ocean-going vessels entering or stopping at a Califor-
nia port of call.61 The emissions limits were set so that it would be
unlawful for a ship entering a California port to emit within the "Regu-
lated California Waters" (twenty-four miles from the coastline) more
particulate matter, nitrous oxide, or sulfur oxide than would have
resulted from the use of a cleaner fuel. 62 These Marine Vessel Rules,
which went into effect on January 1, 2007, were immediately challenged
by the Pacific Merchant Shipping Association, a trade group of compa-
nies that own or operate ocean-going vessels flying under both the
United States and foreign flags.63 PMSA alleged that the Marine Vessel
Rules were preempted by the Clean Air Act, which required the Admin-
istrator's approval to set an emission standard for a non-motor-vehicle
engine, and by the Submerged Lands Act (SLA), which defines the terri-
torial waters of a state as three nautical miles.64 The Ninth Circuit
enjoined the application of the Marine Vessel Rules on the grounds that
emission standards for non-motor-vehicles were exclusively federal
under the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, and therefore could
not be adopted without the approval of the Administrator, which Califor-
nia had not received.6 5 The Ninth Circuit declined to reach the SLA
preemption issue at that time.66
Following the 2008 decision of the Ninth Circuit, CARB returned
Ass'n (PMSA) v. Goldstene (PMSA 11), No. 2:09-cv-01 151-MCE-EFB, 2009 WL 2777778, at *1
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2009).
58. Id.
59. Id. at *2.
60. Id.
61. Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass'n v. Goldstene (PMSA 1), 517 F.3d 1108, 1109-10 (9th Cir.
2008).
62. Id. at 1111-12.
63. Id. at 1109-10.
64. Id. at 1112.
65. Id. at 1115.
66. Id.
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to the drawing board to create the "Vessel Fuel Rules," which, unlike the
Marine Vessel Rules that the Court had found to be preempted, were not
emissions standards but rather were regulations specifying that cleaner,
lower-emissions fuels must be used within the California Regulated
Waters, 24 nautical miles from the coastline. 6 These standards were
scheduled to go into effect on July 1, 2009.68 Again, PMSA challenged
the regulations and sought to enjoin their application, this time on the
basis that the twenty-four-mile application zone was preempted by the
Submerged Lands Act, and that the regulations "otherwise 'unlawful[ly]
and impermissibly regulate[d] navigation and foreign and domestic com-
merce as delegated to the United States Congress .... ' "
The district court, in an unpublished memorandum opinion, dis-
missed PMSA's claims, holding that 1) the Submerged Lands Act did
not preempt the state's regulation of pollution beyond a three-mile zone,
and 2) the regulations were permissible exercises of the state's police
power under the "effects test," which would allow California to "enact
reasonable regulations to monitor and control conduct that substantially
affects its territory."10 The district court readily applied the presumption
against preemption of state laws enacted in the environmental and pollu-
tion control field, distinguishing United States v. Locke on the basis that
"the state regulations at issue in [Locke] served precisely the same pur-
pose as analogous provisions of federal law under the Ports and Water-
ways Safety Act of 1972."171 Thus, according to the Ninth Circuit, "the
issue in Locke was consequently not whether any maritime regulation is
inherently federal," but rather whether a state law was preempted under
the narrow confines of the PWSA.7 2 The state law being applied in the
instant case was, according to the district court, a law that "relates to
pollution, not maritime commerce," an area where there is a historic
presence of state law.73 "Air pollution prevention falls under the broad
police powers of the states, which include the power to protect the health
of citizens in the state."7 "In short," the district court wrote, "because
pollution is an area falling within police powers historically delegated to
67. Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass'n v. Goldstene (PMSA II), No. 2:09-cv-01151-MCE-EFB,
2009 WL 2777778, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2009).
68. Id.
69. Id. at *7.
70. Id.
71. Id. at *5.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. EPA, 217 F.3d 1246, 1255 (9th Cir. 2000); Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960)).
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the states, the presumption against preemption applies in this case."7 5
The district court then certified the case for an immediate interlocu-
tory appeal to the Ninth Circuit, as the Order qualified as involving "a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for
difference of opinion and an immediate appeal may materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation."7 6 The Ninth Circuit granted
the appeal on December 11, 2009, and on March 28, 2011, the decision
in Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass'n v. Goldstene (PMSA III) was
issued, affirming the district court.
B. The Ninth Circuit's Analysis of the SLA Preemption/
Jurisdictional Claim
The Ninth Circuit knew that it faced "a highly unique and challeng-
ing set of circumstances" in hearing PMSA III:
[W]e do believe that the regulatory scheme at issue here pushes a
state's legal authority to its very limits, although the state had clear
justifications for doing so. More generally, we must take into account
such fundamental considerations as, on the one hand, the supremacy
of federal law, the various limitations on state regulations arising out
of the dormant Commerce Clause and general maritime law preemp-
tion doctrines, and the federal government's unquestioned authority
over this nation's relations with foreign countries, and, on the other
hand, the sovereign police powers retained by California allowing the
state to adopt a wide range of laws in order to protect the health,
safety, and welfare of its own residents.
On balance, the Ninth Circuit held that the state interest in maintaining
its sovereign police power authority outweighed the federal interest in
regulation of foreign and maritime affairs." However, before reaching
that balance, the Court had to decide whether it was permissible for Cal-
ifornia to reach twenty-one miles beyond its territorial sea to regulate
ships in the twenty-four mile area defined as the California Regulated
Waters zone.
PMSA did not argue that the California Vessel Fuel Rules were
expressly preempted by any federal statute. Instead, PMSA argued that
the Submerged Lands Act gave rise to a claim of implied field preemp-
tion, the doctrine that provides for the invalidation of state laws when
the state attempts to regulate "conduct in a field that the Federal Govern-
75. Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass'n v. Goldstene (PMSA II), No. 2:09-cv-01151-MCE-EFB,
2009 WL 2777778, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2009).
76. Id. at *8 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006)).
77. 639 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2011).
78. Id. at 1162.
79. Id. at 1182.
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ment intended to occupy exclusively."so This means that, for implied
field preemption analysis, the only task of the Court is to "ascertain the
intent of Congress" in passing the law." PMSA thus argued that the
intent.of Congress in passing the Submerged Lands Act was to compre-
hensively settle the question of where a state was free to enforce state
laws by statutorily demarking the state's territorial sea at a distance of
three miles.82
This argument would seem to have merit. After all, California pur-
ported to extend its legislative power beyond what was allowed as a
state's territorial sea in both the United States v. California decision and
the SLA. Indeed, the regulation at issue here also extends beyond the
federal territorial sea, which under the United Nations Convention of the
Law of the Sea extends out to twelve nautical miles from the baseline."
The United States' 1988 proclamation of its territorial sea as extending
to twelve nautical miles was expressly intended to bring the United
States into conformity with UNCLOS.84 Instead, the twenty-four-mile
limit that California used to create the Vessel Fuel Rules is to the limit
of the "Contiguous Zone," an area where the coastal state (in this case,
the United States, as California is the subdivision of a State in the inter-
national sense) may exercise some limited control in order to prevent
"infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws.""
There is no provision in the contiguous zone for regulation of air pollu-
tion, and UNCLOS provides for international cooperation and agree-
ment in the control of pollution on the high seas." Thus, there appears
to be a strong basis for a claim that federal law preempts California from
regulating air pollution beyond territorial limits. However, the Ninth
Circuit rejected PMSA's federal preemption claims."
The Ninth Circuit, like the district court below, applied the general
presumption against preemption of state laws that are enacted to protect
the health and safety of the state's citizenry." The Ninth Circuit recog-
nized that the Supreme Court, in Locke, had rejected the application of a
80. Id. at 1165 (quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990)).
81. PMSA III, 639 F.3d at 1165.
82. Id. See also United States v. California, 322 U.S. 19, 40-41 (1947) (holding that
California did not have sovereign rights over the three-mile sea belt off its shoreline). The
Submerged Lands Act of 1953 was passed in part to reverse the Supreme Court's holding in
United States v. California, and to return state sovereignty to the three-mile band of ocean referred
to as the state's territorial sea.
83. UNCLOS, supra note 47, at art. 3.
84. Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Dec. 27, 1988).
85. UNCLOS, supra note 47, at art. 33.
86. See id., at pt. XII ("Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment").
87. Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass'n v. Goldstene, 639 F.3d 1154, 1182 (9th Cir. 2011).
88. Id. at 1164-67.
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presumption against preemption in a field "where there has been a his-
tory of significant federal presence" such as national and international
maritime commerce, "where there is no beginning assumption that con-
current regulation by the State is a valid exercise of its police powers."89
However, rather than characterize the Vessel Fuel Rules as regulation
that touches upon international and maritime commerce, the Ninth Cir-
cuit agreed with the district court that "these state regulations ultimately
implicate the prevention and control of air pollution" where there is a
historic presence of state law."o Thus, following the Supreme Court's
decision in Wyeth v. Levine,9 1 the court applied the presumption against
implied field preemption of the Vessel Fuel Rules by the SLA.9 2
It may be illustrative to pause here and ask, as a matter of law and
logic, why the court would need to apply the presumption against pre-
emption at this point in its analysis of the SLA preemption claim. After
all, the presumption against preemption of a state law regulating historic
state powers should apply only to those state laws within the territorial
boundaries of the state. However, the court here used the presumption
against preemption of health and safety regulations, a presumption that
is traditionally justified at least in part by the state's sovereignty over its
lands, waters, and citizens,9 3 to presume that the regulations were not
preempted by a federal law that affirmatively defines the territorial reach
of the state.94 The question before the court was a question of the bound-
aries and reach of a state's legislative jurisdiction and sovereign territory
as defined by the federal law, not a question of whether the state's tradi-
tional power to regulate health and safety within its territorial boundary
should yield to a competing federal interest.95 But does it not seem that
the state's expansive and traditional police powers authority to regulate
pollution, as strong as it may be, should be diluted if the state reaches
beyond its territorial boundaries into the high seas? Surely there is no
89. Id. (citing United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000)).
90. PMSA III, 639 F.3d at 1167.
91. 555 U.S._, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
92. PMSA III, 639 F.3d at 1167.
93. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 151 ("[The state] retains broad regulatory authority
to protect the health and safety of its citizens and the integrity of its natural resources"); Schooner
Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) (discussing the territorial basis of
sovereignty).
94. See Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (2006).
95. Compare Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass'n v. Goldstene, 639 F.3d at 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2011)
with Int'l Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Locke (Intertanko 1), 148 F.3d 1053,
1069 (9th Cir. 1988) (focusing on the fact that the Washington regulations are confined to the
three mile territorial limit of the state); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 495 (9th
Cir. 1985) (stating that stricter standards under the CWA are to apply within three miles of shore),
and Askew v. Am. Waterways Operators, 411 U.S. 325, 327 (1973) (discussing that the Florida
act applies in the state's territorial waters).
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traditional state power to regulate the conduct of ships outside the state's
(and even the federal government's) sovereign domain? 96
The Ninth Circuit disagreed. Following the discussion of the tradi-
tional presumption against preemption, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the
California law in terms of the "effects test," a doctrine of international
law that allows a state to create reasonable regulation of conduct occur-
ring outside its territorial borders if the conduct has or is intended to
have a substantial effect within the territory of the state.97 The Ninth
Circuit relied on a series of cases where states had expanded their reach
beyond the territorial waters of the state in order to enforce minimum
wage regulations," to require ships to take on a state-licensed pilot,99 or
to allow for the prosecution of rapists on cruise ships. 100 While the Ninth
Circuit acknowledged that these cases were distinguishable from the
question of whether a state can regulate pollution by regulation of off-
shore activities, the court found that the clear weight of the case law,
when combined with the presumption against preemption, favored the
state's ability to regulate to prevent the harmful effects of pollution in
the state. 01 In so holding, the Court rejected the claim of PMSA that the
Vessel Fuel Rules, unlike the previously invalidated Marine Vessel
Standards, should not be evaluated under the effects test because it did
not regulate "effects" (such as emissions), but rather required that ships
at sea use a certain kind of fuel.102 The court instead held that "the harm-
ful effects giving rise to the Vessel Fuel Rules appear to be even more
severe than, for example, the somewhat more indirect effect of criminal
acts committed on a foreign cruise ship on the high seas and on a state's
tourism industry."10
It should be noted that the effects of air pollution on the California
population are physical harms, which may strengthen a claim to regulate
based on the effects test.104 However, pollution as an incidental effect of
96. See supra text accompanying notes 78-82.
97. Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass'n, 639 F.3d 1154, 1174-75 (9th Cir. 2011). See also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. §§ 402(1)(c), 403 (1987).
98. Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass'n v. Aubry, 918 F.2d 1409, 1411 (9th Cir. 1990).
99. Warner v. Dunlap, 532 F.2d 767, 768 (1st Cir. 1976).
100. State v. Stepansky, 761 So. 2d 1027, 1029 (Fla. 2000), cert. denied, Stepansky v. Florida,
531 U.S. 959 (2000).
101. Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass'n v. Goldstene, 639 F.3d 1154, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 2011).
102. Id. at 1175 n.6.
103. Id. at 1176. The Court is referring to State v. Stepansky, supra note 93, a Florida Supreme
Court case interpreting a Florida statute that was particularly designed to deal with the problem of
prosecuting common crimes (such as theft and rape) on foreign-flagged cruise ships on the high
seas.
104. See LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 771 (5th ed.
2009) (citing Robert Y. Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Anti-Trust
Laws, 33 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 146, 159 (1957)).
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lawful activity completely outside the state's jurisdiction, such as ship-
ping, would seem to lack the mens rea of an intent to cause harm in the
territory which the harm takes place, and allowing a state to regulate
based on remote repercussions of lawful activity wholly performed
outside the state's territory could potentially provide nearly limitless
regulatory power. 105 This could be particularly problematic in areas such
as pollution control, where the potential harmful effects of lawful activ-
ity are wide-ranging, even global.
C. The Ninth Circuit's Analysis of the Commerce Clause, Maritime,
and Foreign Affairs Preemption Claims
After determining that the reach of the California Air Resources
Board could extend to ships twenty-four miles off the California coast-
line, the Ninth Circuit was then tasked to rule on whether the Vessel
Fuel Rules acted as an impediment to foreign or domestic commerce in
violation of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, or
whether the laws conflicted with the general federal authority over for-
eign affairs and navigation (a claim of "implied field preemption" simi-
lar to the implied foreign affairs preemption of Zchernig).1I 6 The circuit
court again noted the presumption against preemption and dismissed
PMSA's claim. However, in dismissing PMSA's claim, the Ninth Cir-
cuit relied upon what appears to be a traditional domestic dormant Com-
merce Clause analysis, mentioning, but not necessarily applying, the
heightened standard for foreign dormant Commerce Clause analysis that
the Supreme Court had applied in cases such as Crosby and
Garamendi.10o The Ninth Circuit also did not address the Supreme
Court's concern with the proper balance of powers in fields touching
upon foreign affairs that permeated the Court's decision to reject the
presumption against preemption in United States v. Locke.
The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power "[tlo regulate
Commerce with the foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian tribes."' 08 "Under the dormant Commerce Clause doc-
trine, state legislation may be unconstitutional because of its effect on
national and foreign commerce even in the absence of Congressional
action."109 Under traditional dormant Commerce Clause analysis, the
first step is determining whether the challenged law "regulates even-
105. Id. ("If indeed it were permissible to found objective territorial jurisdiction upon the
territoriality of more or less remote repercussions of an act wholly performed in another territory,
then there would be virtually no limit to a State's territorial jurisdiction.").
106. PMSA III, 639 F.3d at 1177-78.
107. See id.
108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
109. PMSA III, 639 F.3d at 1177.
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handedly with only 'incidental' effects on interstate commerce, or dis-
criminates against interstate commerce.""o A restriction that is discrimi-
natory (gives differential treatment to in-state and out-of-state
commerce) is virtually per se invalid and subject to strict scrutiny."' On
the other hand, "nondiscriminatory regulations that have only incidental
effects on interstate commerce are [presumed] valid unless 'the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the puta-
tive local benefits.' "112 Instead, non-discriminatory regulations are eval-
uated under a balancing test to determine if the burdens outweigh the
putative local benefits of the regulation."'
The Ninth Circuit also noted that the Commerce Clause imposes
specific restrictions with respect to the extraterritorial reach of state
laws, and recognized that the foreign commerce context "places further
constraints on state power because of the special need for federal uni-
formity."I14 However, the touchstone used by the Ninth Circuit in deter-
mining whether a regulation directly burdens commerce is whether the
regulation's central purpose is to regulate commerce, "usually in order
to benefit local interests.""' 5 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit determines if
there is a conflict with a local regulation and "general maritime law" (a
traditionally federal affair)' 1 6 by allowing state laws to "supplement fed-
eral admiralty law as applied to matters of local concerns, so long as the
state law does not actually conflict with federal law or interfere with the
uniform working of the maritime legal system.""' The determination of
whether there is any interference is yet another balancing test, "weighing
the state and federal interests on a case-by-case basis.""'
This collection of doctrinal touchstones means that the beginning
presumptions that the Ninth Circuit applied in Pacific Merchants Ship-
ping Ass'n are heavily weighted toward upholding state regulations that
have a central purpose other than the regulation of commerce, such as
pollution control. After applying a presumption against preemption, nar-
110. Id. (citation omitted).
111. Id.
112. Id. (citation omitted).
113. Id. The traditional Commerce Clause test is found in the Supreme Court's decision in Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) ("Where the statute regulates even-handedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.").
114. PMSA III, 639 F.3d at 1178 (citation omitted).
115. Id. (citation omitted).
116. See also U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (The judicial power of the United States "shall
extend . . . to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction . . . .").
117. PMSA III, 639 F.3d at 1178 (citing Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass'n v. Aubry, 918 F.2d 1409,
1422 (9th Cir. 1990)).
118. PMSA Ill, 639 F.3d at 1178.
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rowing the definition of discriminatory legislation to legislation that has
a purpose to regulate commerce to the benefit of local interests, and
premising federal maritime preemption on a balancing test of the federal
and state interests even if the federal interest is uniformity in foreign
affairs, it is little wonder that the Ninth Circuit upheld the Vessel Fuel
Rules. Indeed, the court even looked at its previous decision in Chevron
U.S.A. v. Hammond, where the court had written that "as to environmen-
tal regulation of deep ocean waters, the federal interest in uniformity is
paramount," before upholding the State of Alaska's regulation of ballast
water releases three miles from shore. However, the court did not dis-
cuss the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Locke, which
would seem to argue that these heavily weighted presumptions are inap-
propriate in a case that touches upon international and maritime consid-
erations. Instead the court directly applied the traditional doctrine of
strong state interest from Huron Portland Cement and held that "the
exceptionally powerful state interest at issue here far outweighs any
countervailing federal interests." 20
Arguably, however, there are enough factual and legal differences
between the scenario presented by Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass'n and
United States v. Locke to justify the revival of the presumption against
preemption. First, there is the consideration that there is no federal regu-
lation directly on point regulating the exact same area (vessel fuel
requirements) for the same anti-pollution purpose as the California stat-
ute. This is unlike the Ports and Waterways Safety Act at issue in Locke,
which mandated uniform national rules regarding general tanker design,
operation, and seaworthinessl21-similar subjects to those contained in
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 122 The Clean Air
Act, which had preemptive force in the case of the previous California
emissions standards, does not apply to rules regarding vessel fuel use as
states are permitted to set state in-use requirements-indeed, the Ninth
Circuit noted that California was apparently required to regulate off-
shore ships in order to meet the federal air quality standards set by the
Clean Air Act.123 Second, it is at least arguable that there was no pre-
mise for a claim of interference with foreign affairs: the federal laws
119. Id. at l1 80(citing Chevron U.S.A. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 492 n.12 (9th Cir. 1984)).
120. PMSA III, 639 F.3d at 1181. But see Piazza's Seafood World v. Odom, 448 F.3d 744, 750
(5th Cir. 2006) ("However, in the context of the Foreign Commerce Clause, other considerations
come into play: nondiscriminatory state regulations affecting foreign commerce are invalid 'if
they (1) create a substantial risk of conflicts with foreign governments; or (2) undermine the
ability of the federal government to 'speak with one voice' in regulating commercial affairs with
foreign states.'") (citation omitted).
121. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 101 (2000).
122. UNCLOS art. 21.
123. PMSA III, 639 F.3d at 1181 n.8.
72 [Vol. 66:53
WHO'S AFRAID OF THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE?
implementing Annex VI of the International Convention for the Preven-
tion of Pollution From Ships (MARPOL 73/78) contain an express sav-
ings clause,124 and the United States and Canada had proposed and
established an international agreement under MARPOL that will require
all ships within 200 nautical miles of the United States and Canada to
meet the same sulfur limit as the California Vessel Fuel Rules in
2015.125 The express sunset clause in the California legislation provides
for the termination of the Vessel Fuel Rules when the CARB executive
officer makes a finding that the federal government has adopted and is
enforcing requirements that will achieve equivalent emissions reduc-
tions, so that California's rules would terminate if the MARPOL agree-
ment has the desired effect.126 The court also found that the burden of
compliance with the regulations, while costly, would be a comparatively
small burden: compliance with the regulations was not technically
impossible or particularly difficult, and the cost of approximately
$30,000.00 per vessel call represents less than 1% of the cost of a typical
trans-Pacific voyage, resulting in a negligible increase in consumer
prices.127 Thus, the balance of the burden on federal and foreign inter-
ests may indeed favor California's regulatory scheme.
Finally, as the Ninth Circuit noted, the Supreme Court in Ray v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. upheld many of the Washington State require-
ments, including a tug-escort requirement that did not "impede[ ] the
free and efficient flow of interstate and foreign commerce." 28 And, as
discussed above, even the holding in United States v. Locke was rela-
tively narrow, and provided space for potential regulation that was not in
a direct conflict with a federal statute.129 Thus, a final resolution of the
question of how far a state can reach in enacting "an expansive and even
possibly unprecedented state regulatory scheme" 3 0 for pollution control
may have to wait for Supreme Court resolution-if not in this case, then
the next one.
124. PMSA III, 639 F.3d at 1181. See also 33 U.S.C. § 1911 (2006) ("Nothing in this chapter
shall limit, deny, amend, modify, or repeal any other authority, requirement, or remedy available
to the United States, or any person, except as expressly provided in this chapter.").
125. PMSA III, 639 F.3d at 1161.
126. Id. at 1159.
127. Id. at 1159.
128. Id. at 1176-77 (citing Ray v. Atl. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 179-80 (1978)).
129. See Gudridge, supra note 13, at 748-49. See also supra text accompanying note 13.
130. PMSA III, 639 F.3d at 1181.
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IV. CONCLUSION: PACIFIC MERCHANT SHIPPING Ass'N AND STATE
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS WITH INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS-
WHAT IS A FEDERAL SYSTEM TO Do?
Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass'n v. Goldstene represents a
strongly-worded affirmation of a state's ability to regulate the sources of
pollution beyond its borders. To some extent, it tracks recent Supreme
Court jurisprudence, such as Wyeth v. Levine,'3 1 that strongly supports
the inference of states retaining regulatory authority in areas of tradi-
tional state concern.132 However, the potential of a widely-stretched
variation of the "effects test" that allows for state regulation of offshore
vessels should give pause to those concerned with the viability of a fed-
eral system to address global issues of pollution and climate change.
After all, ships in domestic and international trade are now subject to
differing fuel quality regimes off the California coast-a minor consid-
eration, to be sure, but one that effectively makes the California regula-
tion the default fuel requirement for all ships that call on California
ports, wherever in the world those ships may be. This change also poten-
tially affects the interests of other states in the United States, who will
face price increases on imports that come in from California and will
likewise face price differentials based on ports of call-a lack of uni-
formity that demonstrates why the federal government was given the
Constitutional power to regulate commerce and navigation.133
Furthermore, the decision in Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass'n is
just one of a recent series of cases that have allowed states to enact more
restrictive environmental regulations, even in the face of pre-existing
federal and international regimes. A prime example of more stringent
state regulation as an impetus for policy change is presented by the
recent jurisprudence surrounding the problem of invasive species in ship
ballast water. Invasive species have long been a problem because ocean-
going ships draw in ballast water at ports often thousands of miles away
from the port where the ballast water is eventually released.134 In
Fednav Ltd. v. Chester,' the Eastern District of Michigan upheld
Michigan's Ballast Water Statute1 36 against a preemption challenge
based on federal law and foreign affairs field preemption.13' The Michi-
gan law was more stringent and required different practices than the fed-
131. 555 U.S., 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
132. Wyeth, 555 U.S._,, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194-95 (2009).
133. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 22 (1824).
134. See Zdravka Tzankova, The Political Consequences of Legal Victories: Ballast
Regulation and the Clean Water Act, 40 ENvrL. L. REP. 10154, 10156 (2010).
135. 505 F. Supp. 2d 381 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
136. MicH. COMP. LAWS § 324.3112(6) (2006).
137. Fednav, Ltd., 505 F. Supp. 2d at 400.
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eral regulations in place at the time of the litigation, which were based
on a voluntary agreement that ships would exchange ballast water at sea
at a minimum of 200 nautical miles from shore. 1 8 Shortly after Fednav
was decided, the Ninth Circuit came down with its decision in North-
west Environmental Advocates v. EPA,13 9 which required the EPA to
regulate invasive species in ship ballast water as part of its mandatory
duties under the Clean Water Act.' 40
The EPA responded to the decision in Northwest Environmental
Advocates by issuing a Vessel General Permit regulating ballast water
discharges. 14' However, the Vessel General Permit simply codified
under the Clean Water Act the regulations that were already in place,
such as offshore ballast water exchange. Since many states, including
Michigan and California, have regulatory regimes that are far more strict
than the Vessel General Permit, and since states are permitted to regulate
more stringently than the federal standard under the Clean Water Act's
NPDES program, it is unclear whether the Vessel General Permit will
actually create the federal standard or simply become a background
against which a patchwork of state regulatory regimes implement vary-
ing requirements for the ballast water discharge and treatment from
international ships.14 2 The development of the International Maritime
Organization's Ballast Water Management regime, including the as-yet
unratified Ballast Water Management Convention, adds a further inter-
national dimension to the debate." In the end, the potential for regula-
tory fragmentation inherent in more stringent state regulation of ballast
water under the Clean Water Act may be the trigger for the shipping
industry to throw its support behind comprehensive federal and interna-
tional regimes."' In order to receive the political support of the states,
these federal and international regulations might have to rise to the strin-
gent regulatory level of the most stringent states, creating a standardized
regime that would implement strong environmental controls.'4 5
Could California similarly act as the standards-setting leader in
138. Id. at 387.
139. 537 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2008).
140. Id. at 1026. Ballast water had previously been exempted from Clean Water Act regulation
by rule, which was the rule challenged by environmental advocates in the case. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.3(a) (2006).
141. See Final National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) General Permit for
Discharges Incidental to the Normal Operation of a Vessel, 73 Fed. Reg. 79473 (Dec. 18, 2008).
142. Tzankova, supra note 134, at 10166-67.
143. International Maritime Organization, International Convention for the Control and
Management of Ships' Ballast Water and Sediments (BWM Convention), http://www.imo.org/
About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/Intemational-Convention-for-the-Control-and-
Management-of-Ships%27-Ballast-Water-and-Sediments-(BWM).aspx.
144. Tzankova, supra note 134, at 10169-70.
145. Id.
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greenhouse gas regulation of ships? The Supreme Court's decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA,14 6 like the Ninth Circuit's decision in Northwest
Environmental Advocates, would require the EPA to regulate in an area
where the agency had previously declined to do so-carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gas emissions, including sulfur, from motor vehicle
fuels.'47 California is already empowered to set higher emission control
standards for land-based motor vehicles, which can then be adopted by
other states under the Clean Air Act.'48 Coastal states, concerned with
global warming and sea level rise, are already acting to raise emissions
standards and force federal regulation.149 As Congressional debate about
climate change regulation heats up, states' frustrations with federal inac-
tion could lead to more fragmentary regulation of the type upheld in
Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass'n.'o Again, it may be in the best interest
of the shipping industry to fight for federal and international standards
that rise to a level acceptable to coastal states rather than allow state-by-
state regulation under a police power authority to fill a gap that would
lead to varying requirements for international vessels.
The problem of airborne emissions from ships, like the problem of
global greenhouse gas emissions and climate change generally, is, in the
end, a worldwide problem begging for an international solution.' 5 1 To
some extent, states, and on a larger scale regions, have been adopting
international-law-based models to address climate change within the
federal/state dichotomy of American federalism.'52 Cross-border collab-
oration into voluntary programs that implement ideas such as carbon
trading are expanding the legal vision of what is within the "exclusively
state" sphere of pollution control and the "exclusively federal" sphere of
146. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
147. Id. at 505, 532.
148. See Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1156-57 (E.D.
Cal. 2007) (discussing the California exception to the Clean Air Act preemption of motor vehicle
emissions standards-California can apply to the EPA for a waiver to create more stringent
standards, which can then be adopted by other states as federal standards). See also Green
Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 397-99 (D. Vt. 2007)
(upholding the State of Vermont's adoption of California's emissions standards for motor
vehicles).
149. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, 529 F.
Supp. 2d at 1157.
150. See House Vote 96 - Bars New Regulation of Certain Greenhouse Gases, N.Y. TIMes,
Feb. 18, 2011, http://politics.nytimes.com/congress/votes/ll2/house/1/96. See also supra text
accompanying notes 16-17.
151. See GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 133-82 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007)
(discussing extensively the role of the Clean Air Act and state clean air programs in addressing
global climate change).
152. See Judith Resnik et al., Kyoto at the Local Level: Federalism and Translocal
Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAS), 40 ENvTh. L. REP. 10768, 10768-69 (2010).
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foreign affairs.' It is argued that within the realm of environmental
law, "it is no longer useful to draw sharp distinctions between interna-
tional and domestic law. . . . In the brave new world of global environ-
mental law, the focus is on 'transnational legal processes, governmental
and non-governmental networks, and judicial influence and cooperation
across borders."" 54 So the traditional distinctions of state and federal
may come to be recognized as non-useful limitations when addressing
truly global problems.
Until that day comes, however, courts, such as the Ninth Circuit,
will wrestle with the implications of federalism and the complex balanc-
ing required by preemption doctrine when faced with local environmen-
tal laws with extraterritorial application and international effects. It
remains to be seen whether Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass'n will be part
of a new wave of cases that will eventually require the Supreme Court to
decide the role of the states in solving international problems in a global-
ized world. But at least one precedent for the extraterritorial application
of state environmental law has now been set.
153. See Jeremy Lawrence, Where Federalism and Globalization Intersect: The Western
Climate Initiative as a Model for Cross-Border Collaboration Among States and Provinces, 38
ENVTL. L. REP. 10796, 10796-97 (2008) (discussing the Western Climate Initiative, an
environmental partnership between some Western states and Canadian provinces to create a
regional emissions trading program).
154. Tseming Yang & Robert V. Percival, The Emergence of Global Environmental Law, 36
ECOLOGY L.Q. 615, 625 (2009) (quoting Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and
Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 485, 517 (2005)).
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